Abstract— In articles [1] and [5], the authors point to attacks on TLS that use the Dual EC pseudo-random number generator with the assumption that the attacker knows or generates backdoors in the generator. The attacks in [1] and [5] can not only restore pseudo-random values generated by the Dual EC generator, but also know the subsequent output values. In this paper, we propose two methods of implementation can still use the Dual EC generator but avoid the above attacks. Specifically, our first method is to avoid backdoor existence in the Dual EC generator. Meanwhile, the remaining method can avoid the attacks even backdoor existence and attacker know this backdoor.
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Tài liệu tham khảo [1]. Stephen Checkoway and et al. "On the practical exploitability of Dual EC in TLS implementations." 23rd USENIX Security Symposium (USENIX Security 14). 2014. [2]. Dan Shumow and Niels Ferguson "On the possibility of a back door in the NIST SP800-90 Dual Ec Prng." Proc. Crypto. Vol. 7. 2007. [3]. National Institute of Standards and Technology. Special Publication 800-90A: Recommendation for random number generation using deterministic random bit generators, 2012. [4]. Tim Dierks and Eric Rescorla. RFC 5246: “The transport layer security (TLS) protocol version 1.2”. The Internet Engineering Task Force, August 2008. [5]. Daniel J.Bernstein, Tanja Lange and Ruben Niederhagen “Dual EC: A Standardized Back Door” Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2015/767. |
